Motivation and Introduction
In this paper we make an effort to contribute to the understanding of the dynamics of social unrest and the State response. Getting a better insight of the mechanisms of conflict generation and transmission seems relevant nowadays as markets and society apace in their integration and globalization process. Geopolitical strains quickly impact local and global markets in the form of heightened risk aversion and policy mismanagement with negative spill overs for the economy in many ways. Recent episodes (as the Arab Spring in 2011 or the Ukraine-Russian conflict in 2014) have evidenced how heightened geopolitical risk can morph into extreme financial, macroeconomic and political conditions.
There are different approaches to tackle the analysis of unrest dynamics, from Agent Based models (i.e Epstein, 2001 Epstein, , 2002 to Statistical Models. Only the second one breaches the boundaries of aggregation of social trends, while the first one is more theoretically grounded and matches better individual behaviour.
Statistical models so far have little exploited other social science techniques to analyse joint dynamics of social unrest variables, accounting thus with little track record in pinning down and analysing mass behaviour from unitary agents such as the population and state.
Besides, empirical work has normally focused only in the core interest of normative policy making: the anticipation of conflict by means of early warning systems (EWS), and less attention has been given to analyse the dynamics and interrelation o social unrest variables and its link to the state policy response.
On the other hand, being this an empirical approach not many analyses have tried to match stylized facts with general paradigms of social unrest theory.
This work tries to contribute to this strand of literature in several ways. First, it tries to pin down and analyse the social unrest dynamics in the region of Eurasia, considering not only escalation dynamics within the different unrest variables but also the interaction between two agents: the State and the society. On the other hand, we believe that notable effort has been made in matching stylized facts and the main strands of theoretical literature. And last, but not least, we deem also a contribution our utilization of the massive event based database GDELT to find a simple taxonomy of unrest variables that serves both to measure current state of events and to analyse joint dynamics in real time.
The structure of this work will be the following: section 2 reviews available literature on the current topic, section 3 presents and justifies our database (GDELT) and the extracted social unrest variables, section 4 describes relevant theoretical paradigms applicable for this analysis and justifies the use of Vector Autorregressive Models, section 5 exposes the empirical findings and translates them into a common language of stylized facts, section 6 concludes and suggest possible further research. Section 7 is the appendix.
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The nature of social unrest is changing significantly and it is becoming increasingly important. Thus, the "Global Awakening" (Brezinsky, 2011) has continued to manifest and extending through the world. Moreover, the threat of instability has become more relevant and systemic nowadays given the evolution of technologies and social media, which enables protest to trigger suddenly and in a coordinated way across many locations at once. In that framework, the study of social unrest's evolution and the dynamic relationship between different degrees of instability is becoming crucial. The goal of the paper is to give insights about social unrest's dynamics in Eurasia distinguishing between private agents (the population) and the public sector (the State) from 1995 to the present. The dynamics are analysed on monthly basis but these can be even be updated on daily basis.
Our literature review revealed that social unrest dynamics has not been broadly studied from an empirical point of view. Previous research has addressed this question before, but with different perspectives. Some former studies have been done to understand the causal relationship between protest and repression, ranging both from low to high intensity conflictive behaviour such as the work of Carey (2002) . This approach uses data from nine Latin American and African countries from the late 1970s to the early 1990s to analyse the dynamics behind domestic conflict. She distinguishes two types of unitary actors, the public sector and the private one, as we do and we explain in part 3. She employs a vector autoregression to account for the interdependence of the behaviour of the state and the population. While we use a similar approach, our main contribution here is to use a much richer database with a longer time span as we describe in section 3. Furthermore, we also deepen more in social unrest's dynamics examining the relationship between different degrees of social unrest in the population. We find similar results showing that protest, and state repression present high inertia (i,e response are highly autoregressive). Bischoff and Fink (2013) give a further step in this analysis, demonstrating that repression can explain the variation of political violence in the MENA (Middle East and North Africa) region since repression is related to political violence in a U-shaped fashion (i.e increasing repression decreases political violence, but after a turning point, repression generates it). To test it, they do a time-series-cross-section analysis of repression and political violence using a panel dataset of the MENA countries from 1950 to 2006 from Menaldo (2012) . They also argue that institutional arguments neglect the role of repression in explaining the variation of political violence.
One of the main advantages of our database is that it allows us to feed up our monthly indices on daily basis, giving real time information, while most quantitative studies of conflict and social sciences use data aggregated annually ignoring short-term dynamics. Zeitzoff (2011) attempts to fill this gap analysing the short-term dynamics of military conflict using a dataset of hourly dyadic conflict intensity scores drawn from Twitter and other social media sources during the Gaza Conflict in 2008 and 2009 and employing a vector autoregression. Using monthly indices, updated on daily basis, we also address short term dynamics and, given our larger time horizon, we also account for long term patterns. " dataset created by Leetaru and Schrodt (2013) . GDELT is an open access database containing a comprehensive and high resolution catalogue of geo-referenced socio-political events from 1979 to the present. It contains over 250 million records casting over 300 categories of classified events during the last 35 years with daily updates.
GDELT pins down and processes news in broadcast, print and web media globally in over 100 languages. The information is extracted from the media and systematized using the "Textual Analysis by Augmented Replacement Instructions (TABARI)" algorithm 6 , a machine coding procedure of events that uses pattern recognition to find "Dyadic Relations" and track Events of Interest (EOI). A Dyadic Relation is any relational structure where "active" and "passive" subjects interact by means of an "action", creating thus an "event".
Every type of processed event is then coded using the "Conflict and Mediation Event Observations, (CAMEO)" event coding system developed by Schrodt and Yilmaz (2007) . CAMEO is a broadly used coding scheme to systematise the analysis of political and social events. Each CAMEO event code is assigned a numeric score from the Goldstein Scale, which captures the intensity of the events. The Goldstein Scale developed by Goldstein (1992) is a conflict-cooperation scale from -10 to +10, capturing the theoretical impact that each type of event will have on the stability of a country. In the ordinal scale, -10 indicates an extremely negative action such us detonate nuclear weapons, 0 denotes no action taken and +10 extremely positive actions like surrender militarily and peacekeeping. Thus, GDELT identifies the actors, the actions and the intensity of the events on a daily basis.
There is not much literature that uses this database given its recent appearance in 2013. Previous related literature uses other event datasets such us the integrated Conflict Early Warning Systems (ICEWS) project like in the work of Ward et al. (2012) . ICEWS is an early warning system designed to help US policy analysts to predict a variety of international crises to which the US might have to respond. These include international and domestic crises, ethnic and religious violence, as well as rebellion and insurgency. The main advantage of GDELT with respect to ICEWS is that GDELT is open and freely available 7 , while ICEWS event data was available only for US State use. Besides, the scope and length of both widely differ. ICEWS event data go back to 2001 while GDELT has data since 1979. Moreover, GDELT collects many more events with more precise geographic locations than ICEWS, having then a much larger volume of data. On the other hand, ICEWS is strongly conditioned to its original mandate, survey of South East Asia, so the bias of the information to that region is high 8 .
Other works such as Carey (2002) use data from the Intra-national Political Interactions (IPI) Project to analyse social behavior. This project measures intrastate political conflict and cooperation on a ten-point scale through coding news sources, covering only nine middle powers from Latin American and Africa between 1974 and 1992. This database covers much less events than GDELT, in a shorter period of time and with very lower disaggregation and space location.
Most of the previous studies use yearly or quarterly data for the analysis of social unrest. GDELT allows us to use monthly data whose values may be updated on a daily base. This fact seems more appropriate to capture the dynamics of the interactions between agents in the society on a real time basis.
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The Variables
We use the Conflict and Mediation Event Observations events and actor code (CAMEO) taxonomy to define our variables. Similar attempts to exploit this taxonomy can be found in Zeitzoff (2011) .
Like in Carey (2002) , Bueno de Mesquita (2005) and Bischoff and Fink (2013) , we distinguish between two unitary actors: the population and the State. Also we distinguish between two events: unrest and state action. Social unrest (for the population) is scaled into three variables representing increasing levels of unrest: vindication or low intensity unrest, protests (high intensity unrest) and conflict (violent social action) (see Figure 3 .1). Each categorical variable is calculated as the ratio of observations falling into each category per month in each country divided by the total number of all events recorded in GDELT during the same period of time and in the same location. These ratios are interpreted as real time intensity or diffusion indices showing the behaviour of these unrest variables. In order to correct for the exponential rise in media coverage over time and the imperfect nature of computer processing of the news, we normalise events to reference point in time. The State Response is calculated with a unique measure, a diffusion index (like in Oliver, 1998 ) that casts the net balance of the state responses towards unrest. This balance takes positive values for increasing repression or negative values for degrees of accommodation or state cooperation.
The extracted indices or levels of unrest are intimately linked to the qualitative assessment (made using the Goldstein Scale of events of the news casted into each category (Goldstein, 1992) ). As mentioned above we define four "state" variables, three related to social unrest in the sense of "dissatisfaction in the perception of perceived and imposed social and political reality " (as Renn et. all, 2010) and one related to state or State response (in the sense of Carey, 2002) . Please see Carey (2002) and Bishoff and Fink (2013) .
In general, the extracted variables are not attempting to describe a discrete set of conflict events (as in Brandt et al., 2013) , but rather at offering a general level of unrest intensity and a measure of interaction between the two acting agents: the state and the population. (Pevehouse-Goldstein, 1999 ).
The time span includes monthly data from January 1995 to February 2015. Previous years are discarded to avoid distortions generated with the fall of the Soviet Union. Besides (as Brandt et al. 2013) , we justify the use of short samples to construct our interdependence models of social unrest due to the changing volatility regimes found in the data.
All in all, our dataset is a collection of four stationary time series of each social unrest state in each country or region as well as an indicator of the State policy option. The panel has two hundred and thirty cases, four categories and twenty five countries.
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The Model
The Approach
The main goal of this paper is to understand the dynamic relationships between the different intensities of social unrest (vindication, protest, conflict and State response) by two actors (the Population and the State). In our models, the population can exert different intensities of social unrest from vindication to protest and finally to material conflict. The State response is expressed in one variable but admit both coercion and cooperation.
The conceptual framework of unrest dynamics rests on three paradigms (A) "The unrest life cycle" (Renn et al., 2010) , (B) the "Repression and Reaction" paradigm (Tilly 1984 , Moore 1995 , Lichbach 1995 and (C) the "inertia of social dynamics" (see Brandt, 2009 ).
The Unrest Life Cycle explains the process of escalation of events from early stages of discontent (Vindication) to full blown crisis (Conflict). Under this scheme, the likelihood of the next step in unrest is conditional to cumulative events preceding it. This escalation process is defined by four features that set the stages of social action and reaction explained in part 3:
1. Vindication: Collective feeling of dissatisfaction caused mainly by the perception of policy mismanagement, unfair treatment or loss of trust, mobilizing public opinion yet not actions at this stage. 2. Protest: Ability of collective actors to organize and publicly demonstrate or protest. It activates when legitimized positions from the previous stage are not correctly managed. 3. State response: (In)ability of state forces to de-escalate protest (due to lack of legitimacy, low coercion capacity etc.) or enforceability of the rule of law . 4. Conflict: escalation of protest into an "open physical confrontation between collective actors" over sociopolitical, ethnographic or religious issues, in the words of Gurr and Lichbach (1986) The interaction between the State response variable and the conflict variable is explained under the Repression and Reaction paradigm in Tilly's view (1984) . According to this, conflict is a sustained reciprocal interaction between rational and unitary actors (social challengers and opponents) in context limited information where both act based on the observed behaviour of the opponent. Under this framework, State response in the form of repression succeeds in containing revolt as long as agents can identify that the cost of rebellion overrides that of remaining calm (deterrence effect). However this concept also states that if the scope and intensity of repression is enhanced the deterrence effect may dissolve such that increases in repression may end up causing more violence. Three concrete scenarios arise from this view in the interaction of state and population.
1. A scenario where the increase of repression increases frustration, protest and conflict (Deprivation approach, as in Lichbach, 1987) and the relation between repression and conflict is linear and increasing. 2. A scenario where the increase repression raises the cost of rebellion (Deterrence theory, as in Lichbach, 1987) leading to a decreasing relationship between State coercive action and conflict. 3. A scenario where either insufficient or excessive and indiscriminate repression bring heightened conflict (Francisco, 1982 and Carey, 2002 ) yielding a U-shape form in the relation between State action and conflict reaction (Backslash Theory).
Finally, the concept of inertia and institutional behaviour states that their behaviour is stable through time since the assumed sunk costs of decisions have already been taken place, reducing the incentives to change strategies.
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Our analytic choice
The discovery and interpretation of patterns in large number of events, the analytic specification of choices and the observation of aggregate behaviour arising from the interaction of large numbers of actors, traditionally takes three types of approaches: Agent Based Models, Formal Models and Statistical Models.
We have opted for the third option as it appeals more focused to the subject of this analysis, which strongly relies on the time dynamic interdependence of actors and events. Besides the other two require an approach that is far from the scope of this work.
Statistical modelling of socio-political dynamics is complex for four reasons (Brandt and Freeman, 2009 ):
1. Model Scale or the number of endogenous dyadic relations. 2. Persistence or inertia of social events through time.
3. Endogeneity (a closely related to the model scale problem) linked to the need to identify the causal order among variables. 4. Specification.
Regarding the Model Scale problem, in our case, as our analysis tries to disentangle very concrete features of social unrest and state response (see part 5), we have limited our model to the necessary four variables capable of describing these features, so the Model Scale problem has been -a priori-limited.
The Endogenity problem arises as it is difficult to establish the causal relationship among variables. This holds especially true in political and social interaction analysis as events are mutually caused, and there is no theoretical background to set one (Carey, 2002) . In this analysis however, we have identified a specific causality order consistent with the rationale of our two previously explained theoretical rationalii: "The unrest life cycle" and the "Repression and Reaction" paradigm. According to those, Vindication stands as the least endogenous variable, followed by Protest, State Response and Conflict. Causal order between state and population is articulated through State action preceding conflict for the sake the action and reaction paradigms explained before, but our analysis shows that being mutually causal, the order does not truly matters.
With respect to inertia, in our case, the behaviour of both institutions and individuals is expected to be relatively stable assuring a high degree of persistence. In general terms, we expect our four variables (vindication, protest, conflict and State response) to be stable most of the sample. Besides, protest variables and State responses usually show reinforcing patterns which we can clearly identify with high persistent processes during the conflicts. As explained by Carey (2002) , protest by individuals at time t is expected to lead to further protest in time t+1. Once dissidents have successfully invested the costs of organising themselves and carrying out protest against the State, they try to maintain the momentum and to sustain the protest (Lichbach 1995) . The main argument behind these concepts is that "small numbers of people trigger the participation of larger numbers of people over time" . This persistence is also normal in the State response. In the case of state coercion, policy inertia dampens radical change of the State's behaviour. Therefore, the State tends to maintain strategies, once they have been adopted.
Finally, the theoretical underpinnings of social unrest are still not conclusive. The specification problem remains also important in our object of study. Rather of relying of a theoretical structure we will carry out an empirical assessment of social unrest dynamics. Thus, we just rely of little priori information in our models. First, we believe that the dynamics and interaction between the agents play an important role in the social unrest process. Second, as mentioned above, we include some a priori ordering or sequencing in the Working Paper June 2015 intensity of the social unrest by the population (from vindication to protest and conflict). Finally we do not establish a priori information about the causality relation between population and State and we will test both possibilities.
A suitable model to analyse the dynamics of social unrest and limit the a priori order causality are the Vector Autoregressive Models (VAR) developed by Sims (1980) . In these models, all the included variables are endogenous and by including lags of all the variables the dynamics and persistence can be included. The original VAR models were later complemented with Bayesian Vector Autoregressive models (BVAR) developed by Doan, Litterman and Sims (1984) and Litterman (1986) in which a priori information on the behaviour of the variables and lags can be contrasted with the data to find posterior estimates of the coefficients. Another possibility is Structural Vector Autoregressions (SVAR) or Bayesian Structural Autoregression (B-SVAR) in which the researcher can restrict the covariance matrix to include short term, long term and even sign restrictions in the relationship among the variables in the first case (SVAR) and even combine them with a priori restrictions on the parameters (B-SVAR).
In our case, we opt for VAR models for several reasons. First, the number of variables is only four so the advantages of using the BVAR models are limited. Second, and more important, we rely in a "let's the data talk" strategy and we want to limit as much as possible the a priori restrictions on the behaviour and interactions of agents (population and State) and the dynamics and persistence of their behaviour.
The Model
The general representation of a Vector Autoregressive model for a vector of variables Y and lags l is expressed in equation (1) In (1) the Y t stands for a vector of endogenous variables at time t and with the number of lags (l). The matrix A is the coefficient matrix and is the vector of error terms at time t. In our case the vector of variables Yt includes four variables representing the behaviour of population in terms of Vindication (V), protest (P) and conflict (C) at time t and including also the response of the State (G). The number of the lags will be tested (l) with LR and information criteria. There is also the possibility that the State response precedes the conflict, in this case the reaction of the State will precede the conflict as shown in (1.b). We will test both possibilities in our exercise.
The identification of the system is achieved through the order of the variables. As we don't include restrictions either in the coefficients or the errors we opted for a causal relationship in a Cholesky fashion. In this sense, the contemporaneous relationship among the innovations goes from Vindication, Protest, Conflict and State Response in the first option (1.a). However, there is also the possibility of the escalation to conflict being the result of the State Response. In this case, the Cholesky casual relation will go from vindication, protest, State reaction and Conflict as specified in 1.b. In terms of testing both possibilities, we will check the Granger causality test to check for some conclusions .
We extended our analysis to check the possibility for spill overs or contagion by means of including the same variable for the neighbour country. In this sense, we account for the possibility of contagion not only in the population but also in the States response to unrest. In this case, we estimate eight variables with the N subscript accounting for the neighbour country whose social unrest dynamics can spill over into our country of interest:
Working Paper The results of the impulse response analysis are summarized at the end of the document. For the sake of clarity, they are shown in terms of colour codes (darker are more intense, reddish positive impact, green carry an impact with reverse sign). Impulse Response Functions have been displayed also along the document, but they are represented as the accumulated response of each variable relative to the shock exerted. They are cumulative because -in line with the Unrest Life Cycle Theory-we want to gauge an insight of the long run effects of each shock in determining the potential escalation of events as each shock cumulates the likelihood of transiting to the next level of unrest. The IRFs are given in relative terms to the shocks because we want to normalise the cumulative effects to a common standard.
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Analysis
The objective of this section is to analyse the dynamics of social unrest in Eurasia. We will do this by showing how social unrest and State policy react to local and foreign shocks by means of Impulse Response Analysis of the VAR model described in section 4. We will run this analysis at the aggregate regional and sub-regional level (West-Central-East Eurasia).
As commented in part 3, Eurasian region refers to Bulgaria, Moldavia, Ukraine, Belarus, Serbia, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. We have chosen this set of countries as they account for the wide spectrum 10 of social unrest processes that range from moderate civil transformation (Rose, Orange, Tulip Revolutions as example of protest events) to more-conflict-like events such as political, religious and ethnic clashes (Karabakh conflict in Armenia, Abkhazia conflict in Georgia, etc.). We are not taking into consideration Russia due to its regional dominance and the border-shifting nature of events related to the country 11 .
The control region to whom findings will be contrasted against will be the Middle East and North Africa. In MENA we consider the following countries: Algeria, Libya, Tunisia, Egypt, Syria, Jordan, Turkey, Iran, Bahrain, UAE, Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Oman. We believe that both share a rich and comparable "event" history that permits the analysis using the social unrest taxonomy presented above.
We cast events only in a timeframe that runs from January 1995 until February 2015. We have not used data before 1995 as social events were strongly conditioned by the fall of the Soviet Union and the emergence of Post -Soviet 12 states (1991 -1994) .
The results of the analysis of social unrest dynamics will be described in terms of the following concepts that will help to systematize the stylized facts of social unrest interaction and State response in the region and that are broadly in line with the three paradigms of social unrest described above:
1. Volatility of the society will be measured in terms of the Intensity and the resiliency of shocks that it generates as more volatile indices register stronger shocks. This is concept is in line with the concept of inertia of social unrest described before. 2. Reactivity of the society measured in terms of a. Escalation potential or the intensity and resiliency of the responses in the rest of unrest variables that follow "up the ladder of the shock" 13 (see Figure 3 .1) such as vindication creating protests and protest generating conflict. b. Self-reinforcing potential or feedback intensity of the response "down the ladder of the shock" (protest creating vindication, conflict creating protest and vindication We believe these concepts suffice to describe the most important stylized features of unrest dynamics in the region of Eurasia and that are in line with the main theoretical rationalii of social unrest as explained above.
Estimation results and Granger Causality
We have estimated several VAR models. One for each of the 25 countries and one for each considered region (Eurasia, West Eurasia, Central Eurasia and East Eurasia). We have included enough lags to fully incorporate the short and medium term response of unrest shocks. According to our information criteria (AIC and SC) and LR test, between 3 and 5 lags are enough to support the specifications of our VAR models in each case.
From the estimation results, we asses that most of the parameters that establish the relation between our four regressors are significant and carry the expected sign. Only the coefficients relating State response to the rest of the variables show inconclusive signs. We think it is a consequence of the nature of the variable (a balance between both coercive and cooperative responses). Besides, it is widely documented that not every country reacts in the same manner to the policy option implemented. This can be shown empirically on inspection of Figure 5 .5 graph 3 below.
For the regional VAR model, results of the lag specification tests suggest we should use four-lag model. Thus, using this specification, we test whether vindication, protest, conflict and State response Granger cause each other. The null hypothesis is whether a specific social unrest variable does not Granger-cause another.
In line with the Unrest Cycle Hypothesis and our causal ladder of social unrest, we observe that vindication stands as the least endogenous variable since we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the rest of variables (protest, conflict and State response) do not cause vindication (see Table A .5 in the appendix).
On the other hand, for the rest of variables we actually find mutual causality and interdependence, supporting the empirical evidence of unrest escalation (vindication causing protests, protests causing conflict, etc.) and self-reinforcing dynamics across different unrest levels. Particularly striking is the effect of protest and conflict causing State response (in line with the specification 1.a of the model). Further, we also observe that State response Granger causes conflict, according with the results we present below, but with lower intensity than in the other way around.
Regional aggregate analysis
In this part we run comparative analysis of the concepts stated above between the region of Eurasia and our control group: the MENA region. We retrieve the stylized facts from both the graphs and the colour maps provided in the appendix of the document. According to these:
1. Eurasia and MENA are comparable in terms of social volatility. The intensity and resiliency of shocks to vindication and protest is high and similar in both countries (see Figure 5 .1 graph 1). 2. Eurasian society is less reactive than MENA as shocks to vindication and protest do not escalate into heightened protest or conflict levels as much as MENA does. Besides, self-reinforcing dynamics are also Working Paper
June 2015 stronger in MENA as shocks to protest feed-back into vindication with a stronger contribution than they do in Eurasia. This contributes to the differential reactivity patterns between both regions (see Table A .6 in the appendix). 3. State reaction to unrest in Eurasia and MENA is conditional to the current level of unrest (see Figure 5 .1 graph 3). In fact, policy response to mild social unrest (Vindication) is coercive but as turmoil escalates to Protest or Conflict, it switches to a cooperative mode. This finding is in line with the U-shaped protest/repression binomial found in the literature (Carey, 2002 among others) . 4. Enforceability is low in both regions but lower in MENA (see Figure 5 .1 graph 2). The natural social reaction to a repressive State response is Conflict. This feature is starker in MENA than in Eurasia and creates incentives to switch a cooperative response.
In general, one may say that Eurasia is a fairly volatile region. Shocks are moderately intense and generate resilient dynamics consistently with the inertia paradigm stated above. They generate resilient and intense unrest responses too, that obey to the escalation potential of the region: unrest escalates smoothly and with significant intensity helped by self-reinforcing forces. This bodes well with the standard results of the Unrest Life-cycle Theory. State policy has limited enforcing ability as coercive or repressive action contains but does not suffocate the escalation of unrest into conflict. This feature is consistent with both the Deterrence and Backslash Theories of State repression (see above) and could be the rationale to explain why States switch from coercive to cooperative or accommodative measures as the level of unrest escalates (repressive/coercive when unrest is vindication but cooperative/accommodative as it turns intense protest or conflict). The latter is pretty much in line with Carey's U-shaped reaction of unrest to State action. Finally, Eurasia and MENA share similar features in terms of volatility and reactivity but in MENA, the unrest generation and State reaction are in general more extreme (see Figure 5 .1 graph 1). This is believed because the region might also have comparably less enforcing ability than Eurasia has. Inside Eurasia (a sub-regional analysis)
Being Eurasia a varied geographical, ethnic, religious and political conglomerate, we have taken a closer approach to disentangle the different dynamics within the region. To that end, we follow NATO's sub-regional classification of the area and consider three out of the four classified areas: West Eurasia (or Eastern Europe), Central Eurasia (North and South Caucasus) and East Eurasia (Central Asia). All these have in common the border with Russia which we are not going to consider in the analysis (see Figure A .1 in the appendix).
On inspection of impulse response colour map in the appendix (Table A .7 in the appendix) the following stylized facts are observed:
1. Intensity and resiliency of social volatility is higher in the West and Central Eurasia than in the East (shocks to the three variables are bigger and last longer). Probably as a result of available resources and civil population share. (see Figure 5 .2 graph 1).
2. Social reactivity is also higher in West Eurasia. Vindictive shocks trigger the fastest and most intense responses in Protest and Conflict registered in this region ("Escalation", see Figure 5 .2 graphs 2 y 3). Reactivity in East Eurasia however is more muted (see Figure 5 .2 graph 3).
3. Self-reinforcing dynamics are dominant in Central Eurasia as shocks to protest produce great reaction in Vindication (almost double as much as they are produced on average in Eurasia) what could explain the resiliency of unrest shocks mentioned before.
4. State reaction is asymmetric between the West and Central/East Eurasia. While it turns increasingly repressive with the level of social unrest in the West, it loosens its policy towards cooperation in the Caucasus and even more in East Eurasia (see Figure 5 .2 graph 4).
5. Enforceability is weak in West Eurasia as coercion creates increasing levels of conflict. The same pattern but with lower intensity is observed in Central Eurasia. East Eurasia is once again an exception: coercive measures by the State reduce the intensity of conflict (but with delay).
All in all it seems that the features of aggregate unrest dynamics (intensity, reactivity and enforceability) conceal divergent patterns across the sub-regional levels. The most volatile and thus prone to create stronger and swifter shocks are Western and Central countries that stand above the regional average. The intensity of social shocks is decaying as we move to the East. Most reactive countries are countries in the Caucasus to a large extent due to the feed-back effects of social unrest responses. That is to say: the Unrest Lifecycle Theory and the Inertia Theory are more palpable as we move to the West of the region. Enforceability is weak in the West and in the East, meaning that Conflict increases when State policy enters into action no matter if it prefers repressive (West) or cooperative (East) action. In the Caucasus however, State Response has some effect as it dampens the escalation of unrest into conflict.
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June 2015 In order to run a comparable analysis we have decided to look inside the Central Eurasian region (Caucasus). We opted for these region bis-a-bis the others because the size of states is comparable (once we dismiss Russia) in population, border limits and income per capita and all share the same origin (postsoviet states).
Three countries have been considered: Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan. We chose them because they share vast communalities in unrest generating events (Armenia/Azeri war, Russian/Georgian War, etc.) that we deem useful to trace interaction and join dynamics within the region. The time range that goes from the mid 90's until today accounts for a vast number of socio-political and ethnographical events that fall within the categories of low (Vindication) and high protest (Protest), Conflict and institutional or State response to civil unrest (see Figure 5 .5 and Chronology in Table A .8 in the appendix). Most of these events account for relational features between the three neighbours that allow identifying shared social unrest and State reaction patterns between neighbours and identifying the traces of contagion.
Working Paper June 2015 On Figure 5 .4 we may see the join normalized time dynamics of protest, conflict and State response to the events dated in the chronogram given in Figure 5 .3 (more detailed information about the chronology of social unrest events in Central Asia can be found in Table A .8 in the appendix). We normalize the series to be 100 at the date of each the event and then take the median of the dynamics. We find that the three countries in Central Eurasia have distinguishing features in the evolution of unrest and State response and that interaction matters in the sense that -overtime-countries neighbouring others that experience certain levels of unrest (conflict) experience similar features (spill over effects, Arva et al. 2013) . In this regards we may asses that:
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1. Vindictive and protest dynamics look similar in the three countries but conceal different messages when analysed through time after the outburst of a social event. In the outburst of unrest some follow similar patterns sometimes with delay (Georgia first Armenia follows, Figure 5 .4 graph 1). While others reaction has the opposite sign (Azerbaijan).
2. State reaction also varies among members of the Caucasus, while Georgia normally exerts repression to dampen unrest, Azerbaijan is more prone to cooperate and bend to demands ( Figure 5 .4 graph 2).
3. Conflict in the three follows similar patterns with different intensities (see Figure 5 .4 graph 3). Georgia seems having the least volatile conflict dynamic after an outburst of violence, probably due to the amount of exerted State coercion during the same time (see below in bullet point number 5).
4. When analysing contagion dynamics we find that in all cases contagion is a fact, but the intensities vary with the country and the scale of unrest. In general terms (see Figure 5 .5 graphs 1 y 2) unrest contagion happens instantly when unrest is mild but it takes some time (6 to 9 months) when unrest escalates to conflict. Armenia is the most vulnerable to contagion as it outperforms the rest in all cases.
5. Policy options are also unevenly transmitted across borders (see Figure 5 .5 graph 3). Georgia is the most prone to learn from coercive measures taken from its neighbours while Azerbaijan's first option is for the opposite (cooperation). Armenia does not seem to replicate others coercive measures.
All in all contagion exists at every level of social unrest (from vindication to conflict) but is uneven in intensity and timing and conditional on the nature of the unrest event that has taken place in the neighbour. Low levels of unrest are likely to spread more swiftly and with higher intensity than conflict. At the same time, State policy option is replicated also unevenly across countries; some are prone to mimic the neighbour State's policy while others tend to be neutral or even loose when the neighbours exert coercion. The results of Central Eurasia countries are comparable with those of MENA (see Table A .9 and A.10 in the appendix).
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June 2015 6 Conclusion Eurasia is a fairly volatile region in terms of social unrest dynamics and particularly in terms of intensity and persistence of the shocks. However, social unrest escalation and self-reinforcing potential decays as turmoil escalates. State reaction follows a similar pattern, starting with repression when unrest is mild but as soon as it escalates into protest and conflict, coercion tends ameliorate ore even switch to cooperation. The reason behind it might be the relatively enforcing ability (coercive) of the rule of law of States in the region.
These features are similar to those seen in MENA but the latter is a more extreme case in all terms and cooperative State responses are more frequent in some countries (i.e the Gulf countries).
Additionally, Volatility, Reactivity and Coercion are higher as we move to the West of the Eurasian Region and this goes in line with the decaying enforcing ability of coercion of each state. Similarly the enforceability via coercion in MENA is even lower, justifying the process of change experienced during the last years. Spillover effects are a fact and they are comparable for both private and public actors. Besides they have the same nature and display similar features in Eurasia and MENA. Features amid the processes lived in the MENA region over recent times justify remaining alert and aware of the dynamics of the countries in the Eurasian Region.
The findings of this empirical work bode well with the generalised assumption that there is a lifecycle of social unrest, though its intensity and severity, is uneven across the region and remains conditional of the social and State -momentum. On the other hand, action and reaction theories that explain the effects of State repression on civil population also seem to happen, but results related to dominating paradigm (Deterrence effects, backlash effects etc) are so far inconclusive. This is partially the result of the lack of cooperative State responses in this region.
This work represents an empirical assessment of social unrest dynamics. Other analytical approaches to contrast some of the findings against a firm theoretical framework would be advisable. As such, Agent Based Models are promising means of closing the gap between empirical and theoretical assumptions. If relying on empirical methods and more specifically on VAR models, circumventing some data problems such as changing volatility regimes (especially in MENA before and after 2011 due to the Arab Spring) would be advisable, in this sense, a Bayesian approach could be convenient to select shorter sample sizes without loss of generality. Alternatively a Panel VAR could be used to exploit the information across the different countries on expense of shorter time series. This is left for further research.
June 2015 7 Appendix Armenia and Azerbaijan. An independent Republic of Armenia was proclaimed at the end of the [1914] [1915] [1916] [1917] [1918] War but it lasted only until the beginning of the 1920s when the Bolsheviks incorporated it into the Soviet Union. Armenia's return to independence in 1991 was overshadowed by the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh, the predominantly Armenian-populated region in Azerbaijan (see Current conflicts section). Full-scale war broke out the same year as ethnic Armenians in Karabakh fought for independence, supported by troops and resources from Armenia proper. A ceasefire in place since 1994 has failed to deliver any lasting solution.
Russia, France and the US co-chair the OSCE's Minsk Group, which has been attempting to broker an end to the dispute for over a decade. In 1997, the group tabled settlement proposals seen as a starting point for negotiations by Azerbaijan and Armenia but not by the de facto authorities in Nagorno-Karabakh itself. When the then-Armenian-president Levon Ter-Petrosyan tried to encourage Nagorno-Karabakh to enter into talks he was forced to resign amid cries of betrayal. Azerbaiijan declared illegitimate a referendum held in the region in December 2006. Armenia's president Serzh Sarkisian and Azerbaijan's Ilham Aliyev agreed in November 2008 to intensify their efforts to find a political settlement to the dispute over Nagorno-Karabakh. They claimed to have made significant progress at talks in Prague in May 2009 on the sidelines of the EU's Eastern Partnership summit.
